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The underlying idea behind the construction of indices of economic inequality
is based on measuring deviations of various portions of low incomes from
certain references or benchmarks, that could be point measures like population
mean or median, or curves like the hypotenuse of the right triangle where every
Lorenz curve falls into. In this paper we argue that by appropriately choosing
population-based references, called societal references, and distributions of
personal positions, called gambles, which are random, we can meaningfully
unify classical and contemporary indices of economic inequality, as well as
various measures of risk. To illustrate the herein proposed approach, we put
forward and explore a risk measure that takes into account the relativity of
large risks with respect to small ones.
Keywords : economic inequality, reference measure, personal gamble, inequal-
ity index, risk measure, relativity.
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1 Introduction
The Gini mean dierence and its normalized version, known as the Gini index, have aided
decision makers since their introduction by Corrado Gini more than a hundred years ago
(Gini, 1912, 1914, 1921; see also Giorgi, 1990, 1993; Ceriani & Verme, 2012; and references
therein). In particular, the Gini index has been widely used by economists and sociologists
to measure economic inequality. Measures inspired by the index have been employed to
assess the equality of opportunity (e.g., Weymark 2003; Kovacevic, 2010; Roemer, 2013)
and estimate income mobility (e.g., Shorrocks, 1978). Policy makers have used the Gini
index in quantitative development policy analysis (e.g., Sadoulet & de Janvry, 1995) and
in particular for assessing the impact of carbon tax on income distribution (e.g., Oladosu
& Rose, 2007). The index has been employed for analysing inequality in the use of natu-
ral resources (e.g., Thompson, 1976) and for developing informed policies for sustainable
consumption and social justice (e.g., Druckman & Jackson, 2008). Various extensions
and generalizations of the idex have been used to evaluate social welfare programs (e.g.,
Duclos, 2000; Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005; Korpi & Palme, 1998; Ostry et al., 2014)
and to improve the knowledge of tax-base and tax-rate eects as well as of temporal reper-
cussions of distinct patterns of taxation and public nance on the society (e.g., Pfahler,
1990; Slemrod, 1992; Yitzhaki, 1994; Van De Ven et al., 2001). Several classication
methods (e.g., Hand, 2001) have employed the Gini index for modeling consumer credit
risk and monitoring customer performance. Furthermore, the Gini index is known to be a
transformation of the area under the ROC curve, which has been widely used for assessing
performance of classication rules and facilitated prudent decision making in a variety of
areas (e.g., Krzanowski & Hand, 2009), including market segmentation (e.g., Benton &
Hand, 2002). Business analysts and managers, including those of sports teams, have used
the Gini index to gain useful information about the market and consumer behaviour (e.g.,
Fort & Quirk, 1995; Manasis et al., 2013; Manasis & Ntzoufras, 2014). Denneberg (1990)
advocated the use of the Gini mean dierence and the Gini index as safety loadings for
insurance premiums.
Given all these and other diverse uses, we nd a multitude of interpretations, math-
ematical expressions, and generalizations of the index in the literature. As noted by
Ceriani & Verme (2012), Corrado Gini himself had proposed no less than thirteen formu-
lations of his original index. Yitzhaki (1998, 2003), and Yitzhaki & Schechtman (2013)
have discussed a great variety of interpretations of the Gini index. Many monographs and
handbooks have been written on measuring economic inequality where the Gini index and
its various extensions and generalizations have played prominent roles: Amiel & Cowell
(1999), Atkinson & Bourguignon (2000, 2015), Atkinson & Piketty (2007), Banerjee &
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Duo (2011), Champernowne & Cowell (1998), Cowell (2011), Kakwani (1980a), Lam-
bert (2001), Nygard & Sandstrom (1981), Ostry et al. (2014), Piketty (2014), Sen (1997),
Silber (1999), and Yitzhaki & Schechtman (2013), to name a few.
Given all this diversity, one naturally wonders if there is one underlying thread that
unies all these indices. The population Lorenz function, as well as its various distances
from the hypotenuse of the right triangle where every Lorenz function falls into, have
traditionally provided such a thread (cf., e.g, Zitikis, 2002, for a mathematical viewpoint of
the problem). However, recent developments in the area of measuring economic inequality
(cf., e.g., Palma, 2006; Zenga, 2007; Gastwirth, 2014) have highlighted the need for
departure from the population mean, which is inherent in the denition of the Lorenz
function as the benchmark or reference point for measuring economic inequality. The
newly developed indices have deviated from the aforementioned unifying thread and thus
initiated a fresh rethinking of the problem of measuring inequality.
Bennett & Zitikis (2015) have recently made a step in this direction by suggesting a
way to bridge Harsanyi's (1953) and Rawls's (1971) conceptual frameworks via a spectrum
of random societal positions. In this paper we make a further step by developing a
mathematically rigorous approach for unifying and interpreting numerous classical and
contemporary indices of economic inequality, as well as those of risk. Briey, the approach
we have developed is based on appropriately chosen
1) societal references such as the population mean, median, or some population-tail based
measures, and
2) distributions of random personal positions or gambles that determine person's position
on a certain population-based function.
Certainly, the literature is permeated with discussions related to points 1) and 2). For
example, the choice of appropriate reference measures and inherent relativity issues have
been prominently discussed by Sen (1983, 1998), Duclos (2000), and many others. The
relativity of economic inequality measurement has been present in virtually every work,
due to the fact that the very basic underlying quantities such as the Lorenz function
are relative quantities with respect to the population mean income. Furthermore, the
construction of distributions that govern personal random positions on population-based
functions have been explored within a variety of contexts, such as the dual or rank-
dependent utility theory (Quiggin, 1982, 1993; Schmeidler, 1986, 1989; Yaari, 1987), other
non-expected utility theories (e.g., Puppe, 1991; Machina, 1987, 2008; and references
therein), distortion risk measures (Wang, 1995, 1998), and weighted insurance premium
calculation principles (Furman & Zitikis, 2008, 2009).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we revisit the classical Gini
index and, in particular, express it in two ways { absolute and relative { within the frame-
work of expected utility theory using appropriately chosen gambles and societal functions
(i.e., Lorenz and Bonferroni). In Section 3 we step aside from the Lorenz and Bonferroni
functions and, crucially for this paper, suggest using a lower conditional expectation as the
underlying societal function on which various personal gambles are played; yet, the refer-
ence measure still remains the mean income F . In Section 4 we depart from the latter
reference and introduce a general index that accommodates any population-based refer-
ence measure F . In Sections 5 and 6, we show how the Donaldson-Weymark-Kakwani
index and the Wang (or distortion) risk measure, as well as their generalizations, fall into
the expected utility framework with collective mean-income references and appropriately
chosen personal gambles. In Section 7 we argue for the need of incorporating personal
preferences into reference measures, and in Section 8 we demonstrate how this yields a
new measure of risk that takes into account the relativity of large (e.g., insurance) losses
with respect to smaller ones. The paper nishes with a general and highly-encompassing
index of inequality and risk, dened and discussed in Section 9.
2 The classical Gini index revisited
Naturally, we begin our arguments with the classical index of Gini (1914). Let X be an
`income' random variable with non-negatively supported cdf F (x) and nite mean value
F = E[X]. The Gini index, which we denote by GF , is usually interpreted as twice
the area between the actual population Lorenz function (Lorenz, 1905; Pietra, 1915;
Gastwirth, 1971)
LF (p) =
1
F
Z p
0
F 1(t)dt
and the equalitarian Lorenz function LE(p) = p, 0  p  1, which is the hypotenuse
of the right triangle that we have eluded to in the abstract. For parametric expressions
of LF (p), we refer to Gastwirth (1971), Kakwani & Podder (1973), as well as to more
complete and recent works by Kleiber & Kotz (2003), Sarabia (2008), Sarabia et al.
(2010), and references therein. Hence, the Gini index is
GF = 2
Z 1
0
 
LE(p)  LF (p)

dp
= 2E

LE()  LF ()

; (2.1)
where the gamble  follows the uniform density on the unit interval [0; 1], that is, f(p) = 1
for all p 2 [0; 1]. Intuitively,  governs the person's position in terms of income percentiles,
and we thus call it personal gamble. In other words, barring the normalizing constant 2,
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the Gini index GF is the expected absolute-deviation of the person's position  on the
actual Lorenz function LF (p) from his/her position on the reference (equalitarian) Lorenz
function LE(p). Naturally, the position  is random, and we have already seen in the case
of the Gini index that it follows the uniform on [0; 1] distribution. This means that the
person has equal chance of receiving any income among all the available incomes which
are, in terms of percentiles, identied with the unit interval [0; 1].
In general, the personal gamble  can follow various distributions on [0; 1], and we
shall see a variety of examples throughout this paper. The choice of distribution of the
gamble  carries information about person's probable positions and is thus inevitably
subjective, but many of the examples that we have encountered in the literature follow
the beta distribution
fBeta(p j ; ) = p
 1(1  p) 1
B(; )
for 0 < p < 1;
which we have visualized in Figure 2.1. We succinctly write   Beta(; ) and so, for
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Figure 2.1: Beta densities of gambles  for various values of  and .
example, the Gini index (cf. equation (2.1)) is based on   Beta(1; 1). For illuminating
discussions and historical notes on the beta and other related distributions in the context
of measuring economic inequality, we refer to Kleiber & Kotz (2003). For a very general
yet remarkably tractable beta-generated family of distributions that oers great modeling
exibility, we refer to Alexander et al. (2012).
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Importantly for our following discussion, the Gini index GF can also be viewed as the
expected relative-deviation of the person's position  on the actual Lorenz function LF (p)
from his/her position on the reference Lorenz function LE(p), as seen from the equations:
GF =
Z 1
0

1  LF (p)
LE(p)

2p dp
= E

1  LF ()
LE()

; (2.2)
where   Beta(2; 1), which is a considerable change from the gamble   Beta(1; 1)
used in the absolute-deviation based representation (2.1) of the Gini index. Note that the
right-hand side of equation (2.2) can be succinctly written as E[BF ()], where
BF (p) = 1  LF (p)
LE(p)
= 1  LF (p)
p
(2.3)
is the Bonferroni function of inequality (cf. Bonferroni, 1930), which is also known in
the literature as the Gini function of inequality because it appeared in Gini (1914). For
details on the Bonferroni function and the corresponding Bonferroni index, we refer to
Tarsitano (1990) and references therein.
In addition to its role when studying income and poverty, the Bonferroni function
BF (p) has also found many uses in other elds such as reliability, demography, insurance,
and medicine (cf. Giorgi & Crescenzi, 2001; and references wherein). For detailed histori-
cal notes and references with explicit expressions for the Lorenz and Bonferroni functions,
as well as for the Gini and Bonferroni indices, in the case of a great many parametric
distributions, we refer to Giorgi & Nadarajah (2010). The role of the Bonferroni function
within the framework of L-functions for measuring economic inequality and actuarial risks
can be found in Tarsitano (2004), and Greselin et al. (2009).
3 From equalitarian Lorenz to the mean reference
Not only the classical Gini index but also a multitude of other indices of economic in-
equality can be viewed as some deviation measures (e.g., functional distances) between
the actual and equalitarian Lorenz functions (cf., e.g., Zitikis, 2002). Note, however, that
the actual Lorenz function LF (p) itself is a relative measure that compares p  100% of
lowest incomes with the population mean income F . This two-stage relativity { rst with
respect to the equalitarian Lorenz function and then with the mean income { warrants a
serious rethinking of the inequality measurement.
Toward this end, we next rephrase the denition of the Gini index GF by rst rewriting
the Bonferroni function BF (p) as follows:
BF (p) = 1  LCEF (p)
F
; (3.1)
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where
LCEF (p) =
1
p
Z p
0
F 1(t)dt
is the lower conditional expectation of X. Indeed, with a little mathematical caveat,
LCEF (p) is the conditional expectation E[X j X  F 1(p)], which is the mean income of
those who are below the `poverty line' F 1(p). In summary, equation (2.2) becomes
GF = E

1  LCEF ()
F

(3.2)
with the gamble   Beta(2; 1).
Interestingly, if instead of the latter gamble we use   Beta(1; 1) on the right-hand
side of equation (3.2), then the expectation turns into the Bonferroni index
BF =
Z 1
0

1  LCEF ()
F

dp: (3.3)
For details on this index, we refer to Tarsitano (1990) and references therein. For a com-
parison of the two weighting schemes, that is, of the gambles  employed in the Gini and
Bonferroni cases, we refer to De Vergottini (1940). Implications of using the Bonferroni in-
dex on welfare measurement have been studied by, e.g., Benedetti (1986), Aaberge (2000),
and Chakravarty (2007). Nygard & Sandstrom (1981) give a wide-ranging discussion on
the use of Bonferroni-type concepts in the measurement of economic inequality. Giorgi
& Crescenzi (2001), and Chakravarty & Muliere (2004) propose poverty measures based
on the fact that the Bonferroni index exhibits greater sensitivity on lower levels of the
income distribution than the Gini index. A general class of inequality measures inspired
by the Bonferroni index has been explored by Imedio-Olmedo et al. (2011). Giorgi (1998)
provides a list of Bonferroni's publications.
Equations (3.2) and (3.3) suggest that the Gini and Bonferroni indices are members
of the following general class of indices
AF = E[v(LCEF (); F )]; (3.4)
where v(x; y) can be any function for which the expectation is well-dened and nite. In
the case of the Gini and Bonferroni indices (cf., e.g., Greselin, 2014), we have v(x; y) =
1 x=y, which is the relative value of x with respect to y; we call any function v(x; y) used
in expressions like (3.4) a relative-value function throughout this paper. Hence, we can
view the index AF as the expected utility of being in the society whose income distribution
is depicted by the lower conditional expectation LCEF (p) and compared with the reference
mean income F using an appropriately chosen relative-value function v(x; y).
The class of relative-value functions v(x; y) is very large, but in this paper we only
deal with those that are of the form
v(x; y) = `(x=y) (3.5)
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for some function `(t). This form is natural because under the assumption of positive
homogeneity on the function v(x; y), which means that the equation v(x; y) = v(x; y)
holds for all  > 0, Euler's classical theorem says that we must have equation (3.5) for
some function `(t).
Hence, the Gini and Bonferroni indices produce the function `(t) = 1   t. Another
example of the function `(t) arises from the E-Gini index of Chakravarty (1988):
CF; = 2
Z 1
0
(t  LF (t))dt
1=
= 2
Z 1
0

1  LCEF ()
F

tdt
1=
=
2
( + 1)1=

E[v(LCEF (); F )]
1=
; (3.6)
where the reference-value function is v(x; y) = (1   x=y), that is, `(t) = (1   t), and
the gamble   Beta(+1; 1). Zitikis (2002) suggests using (+1)1= instead of 2 in the
denition of the E-Gini index (see also Zitikis, 2003, for additional notes) in which case
the right-hand side of equation (3.6) turns into the index
eCF; = E[v(LCEF (); F )]1=:
In either case, note from the expressions of CF; and eCF; that it is sometimes useful to
transform the index AF by some function w(x). We shall elaborate on this point in the
next section.
Coming now back to the indexAF , we note that with the generic relative-value function
v(x; y) = `(x=y), the index can be rewritten as E[`(BF ())], where `(t) = `(1  t). Hence,
we are dealing with the distorted Bonferroni function `(BF (p)), 0 < p < 1, which is
analogous to the distorted Lorenz function upon which Sordo et al. (2014) have built their
far-reaching development of Aaberge's (2000) work. We do not pursue this research venue
in the present paper because the Bonferroni function, just like that of Lorenz, incorporates
a pre-specied reference measure, which is the mean income F . In what follows, we shall
argue in favour of more exibility when choosing reference measures, which may even
incorporate personal preferences in addition to those of the entire population.
4 From the mean to generic societal references
We are now in the position to extend the index AF to arbitrary references, which we
denote by F . Namely, let
BF = w

E[v(LCEF (); F )]

;
8
where w(x) is a `normalizing' function whose main role is to t the index into the unit
interval [0; 1], with value 0 meaning `perfect equality' and 1 `extreme inequality.' The
exibility to manipulate with references is important due to a variety of reasons. For
example, the increasing skewness of populations could make the use of the mean F
questionable, and this has been noted by Gastwirth (2014) who, in his research on the
changing income inequality in the U.S. and Sweden, has suggested replacing the mean F
by the median mF = F
 1(0:5).
Another example of F that diers from F is provided by the Palma index (cf.,
Cobham & Sumner, 2103a,b, 2014). Namely, let F be the average of the top 10% of
the population, that is, F =
1
0:1
R 1
0:9
F 1(t)dt. Furthermore, let the normalizing function
be w(x) = x, the relative-value function v(x; y) = y=x, and the (deterministic) gamble
 = 0:4. Under these specications, the index BF reduces to the Palma index of economic
inequality:
P40;90F =
1
0:1
R 1
0:9
F 1(t)dt
1
0:4
R 0:4
0
F 1(t)dt
:
Instead of the underlying random variable (e.g., income) X, the researcher might be
primarily interested in its transformation (e.g., utility of income) u(X). To tackle this
situation, we rst incorporate the transformed incomes into our framework by extending
the denition of the lower conditional expectation as follows:
LCEF;u(p) =
1
p
Z p
0
u(F 1(t))dt:
Note that LCEF;u(1) = E[u(X)], which we can view as the expected utility of X. We
have arrived at the extension
CF = w

E[v(LCEF;u(); F )]

of the index BF .
The Atkinson (1970) index, which we denote by AF; , is a special case of CF . Namely,
let the utility function be u(x) = x for some  2 (0; 1). Furthermore, let the (deter-
ministic) gamble be  = 1, the reference F = u(F ), and the relative-value function
v(x; y) = 1   x=y. Under these specications, the index CF turns into 1   E[X]=F ,
which after the transformation with the function w(x) = 1   (1   x)1= becomes the
Atkinson index
AF; = 1  (E[X
])1=
F
:
This index has been highly inuential in measuring economic inequality (cf., e.g., Cowell,
2011, and references therein) and inspired a variety of extensions and generalization of the
Gini index; we shall say more on this in the next section. Furthermore, Mimoto & Zitikis
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(2008) have found the Atkinson index useful in developing a statistical inference theory
for testing exponentiality, which has been a prominent problem in life-time analysis and
particularly in reliability engineering.
5 Donaldson-Weymark-Kakwani index
The Donaldson-Weymark-Kakwani index (Donaldson & Weymark, 1980, 1983; Kakwani,
1980a,b; Weymark, 1981)
DWKF; = (  1)
Z 1
0
(1  p) 2(p  LF (p))dp;
which is also known as the S-Gini index, has arisen following Atkinson's (1970) criticism
of the Gini index GF for not being able to take into account social preferences. Via the
parameter  > 1, the index DWKF; can reect dierent social preferences, with the
classical Gini index arising by setting  = 2. We note in this regard that a justication
for a family of indices to be based on the theory of relative deprivation has been provided
by Yitzhaki (1979, 1982).
Just like the Gini index GF , the index DWKF; can also be placed within the framework
of expected relative value. Indeed, using equations (2.3) and (3.1), we have
DWKF; =
Z 1
0

1  LF (p)
p

fBeta(p j 2;   1)dp
=
Z 1
0

1  LCEF (p)
F

fBeta(p j 2;   1)dp
= E[v(LCEF (); F )] (5.1)
with the relative-value function v(x; y) = 1   x=y and the gamble  that follows the
distribution Beta(2;   1), whose density we have visualized in Figure 5.1.
We next introduce a more exible index than DWKF; that allows us to employ more
general gambles than . For this, we rst introduce a class of generating functions:
(H) Let h : [0; 1]! [0; 1] be any twice dierentiable and convex function (i.e., h00(t)  0
for all t 2 (0; 1)) that satises the boundary conditions h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1, and
such that h0(0) 6= 1.
Let h denote the gamble whose density f(t) is given by the formula
f(t) =
t h00(1  t)
1  h0(0) (5.2)
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Figure 5.1: The density of  for various values of .
for all t 2 (0; 1), and f(t) = 0 elsewhere. With the relative-value function v(x; y) =
1  x=y, we have (details in Appendix A)
DWKF;h := E[v(LCEF (h); F )]
=
1
1  h0(0)

1  1
F
Z 1
0
F 1(t)h0(1  t) dt

=
1
1  h0(0)

1  1
F
Z 1
0
h(1  F (x)) dx

: (5.3)
To illustrate, we choose the function h(t) = t with any  > 1, in which case the
gamble h follows the density (   1)p(1   p) 2; that is, h  Beta(2;    1), which
means that h has the same distribution as the earlier noted gamble . Consequently,
DWKF;h reduces to DWKF;, and thus equations (5.3) reduce to the following expressions
of the Donaldson-Weymark-Kakwani index:
DWKF; = 1  
F
Z 1
0
F 1(t)(1  t) 1dt
= 1  1
F
Z 1
0
(1  F (x))dx (5.4)
(cf. Donaldson & Weymark, 1980, 1983; Yitzhaki, 1983; Muliere & Scarsini, 1989).
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6 Wang risk measure
The index DWKF;h is based on gambles generated by convex functions h. A similar
index but based on concave generating functions g is called the Wang (or distortion)
risk measure, which has been used in actuarial science and nancial mathematics for
measuring risks. In detail, the risk measure is dened by the formula
WF;g =
Z 1
0
g(1  F (x)) dx;
where g : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is a distortion function, meaning that it is non-decreasing and
satises the boundary conditions g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
Hence, unlike in the previous section, we now work with concave distortion functions,
denoted by g, under which the risk measure WF;g is coherent (Wang et al., 1997; Wang &
Young, 1998; Wirch & Hardy, 1999; see Artzner et al., 1999, for a general discussion). A
classical example of such a distortion function is g(t) = t for any  2 (0; 1), in which case
the Wang risk measure WF;g reduces to the proportional-hazards-transform risk measure
(Wang, 1995)
PHTF; =
Z 1
0
(1  F (x)) dx:
For more information on concave vs convex distortion functions in the context of mea-
suring risks, their variability and orderings, we refer to Sordo & Suarez-Llorens (2011),
Giovagnoli & Wynn (2012), and references therein.
We shall next show that the Wang risk measure WF;g can be placed within the frame-
work of expected relative value. When compared with the index DWKF;, there are two
major changes: First, the function of interest is now the upper conditional expectation:
UCEF (p) =
1
1  p
Z 1
p
F 1(t)dt:
(Note that when p = 0, then UCEF (p) is equal to the mean F .) Second, the function g
that generates the distribution of the random position is concave; specically, we introduce
the following class of generating functions:
(G) Let g : [0; 1]! [0; 1] be twice dierentiable and concave function (i.e., g00(t)  0 for
all t 2 (0; 1)) that satises the boundary conditions g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1, and such
that g0(1) 6= 1.
Any such function g generates the density f(t) of the gamble g given by the formula
f(t) =
 (1  t)g00(1  t)
1  g0(1) (6.1)
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for all t 2 (0; 1), and f(t) = 0 elsewhere. With the relative-value function v(x; y) =
x=y   1, we have (details in Appendix A)
E[v(UCEF (g); F )] =
1
1  g0(1)

1
F
Z 1
0
F 1(t)g0(1  t) dt  1

=
1
1  g0(1)

1
F
Z 1
0
g(1  F (x)) dx  1

: (6.2)
Consequently, the Wang risk measure WF;g can be expressed in terms of the expected
relative value E[v(UCEF (g); F )] as follows:
WF;g = F

E[v(UCEF (g); F )]
 
1  g0(1)+ 1: (6.3)
When the generating function is g(t) = t for any  2 (0; 1), then the gamble g follows
the distribution Beta(1; ) whose density function (1  p) 1 is depicted in Figure 6.1.
From equation (6.2) we have
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
3
4 α = 0.1
α = 0.5
α = 0.8
α = 0.9
Figure 6.1: The density of g when g(t) = t
 for various values of .
E[v(UCEF (); F )] =
1
1  

1
F
Z 1
0
(1  F (x)) dx  1

: (6.4)
Consequently, we have the following expression for the proportional-hazards-transform
risk measure:
PHTF; = F

E[v(UCEF (g); F )]
 
1  + 1:
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7 From collective to individual references
So far, we have worked with collective references; they do not depend on the outcome of
any personal gamble and thus apply to every member of the society. Such references may
not, however, be always desirable or justiable. For example, given the outcome 0:4 of
the gamble , meaning that the person is considered to be among the p = 40% of the
lowest income earners, the person may wish to compare his/her situation to that as if
he/she were among 1  p = 60% of the highest income earners. In such situations we are
dealing with individual references; their values may depend on outcomes of the personal
gamble .
Hence, for example, the mean F and the median mF = F
 1(0:5) are collective ref-
erences, but F = F
 1() is an individual reference because its value depends on the
outcome of . But would the quantile F 1() be a good reference? There are at least
two major reasons against the use of the quantile, which is known in the risk literature
as the value-at-risk:
1) The quantile F 1() is not robust with respect to realized values of the random gamble
 in the sense that the quantile may change drastically even for very small changes of
the realized values of .
2) For a given realized value of , the quantile F 1() is not informative about the values
of F 1(p) for p > . Indeed, for a given realized-value of , we may see the same value
of F 1() irrespective of whether the cdf F is heavy- or light-tailed.
These are serious issues when constructing sound measures of economic inequality
and risk. In the risk literature (cf., e.g., McNeil et al., 2005; Meucci, 2007; Pug &
Romisch, 2007; Cruz, 2009; Sandstrom, 2010; Cannata & Quagliariello, 2011; and refer-
ences therein) the problem with quantiles has been overcome by using the tail -value-at-
risk, which is the upper conditional expectation whose denition was given in the previous
section. For example, adopting UCEF () as our (individual) reference F and using the
normalizing function w(x) = x, the earlier introduced index BF turns into the Zenga
(2007) index
ZF =
Z 1
0

1  LCEF (p)
UCEF (p)

dp
= E[v(LCEF ();UCEF ())] (7.1)
with the relative-value function v(x; y) = 1  x=y and the gamble   Beta(1; 1). Hence,
the Zenga index ZF is the average with respect to all percentiles p 2 (0; 1) of the relative
deviations of the mean income of the poor (i.e., those whose incomes are below the
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poverty line F 1(p)) from the corresponding mean income of the rich, that is, of those
whose incomes are above the poverty line F 1(p). We refer to Greselin et al. (2013) for
a more detailed discussion of the relative nature of the Gini and Zenga indices, and their
comparison.
8 Relative measure of risk
Many risk measures that have appeared in the literature are designed to measure absolute
heaviness of the right-hand tail of the underlying loss-distribution. Suppose now that
we wish to measure the severity of large (e.g., insurance) losses relative to small ones.
Notice that this problem is very similar to that tackled by Zenga (2007) in the context
of economic inequality. Hence, following the same path but now using the relative-value
function v(x; y) = y=x  1 and generic gamble , we arrive at the relative measure of risk
RF = E[v(LCEF ();UCEF ())]: (8.1)
Of course, given the above relative-value function, we can rewrite this risk measure in the
spirit of expected utility
RF = E[RF ()]; (8.2)
where the role of utility function is played by the risk function
RF (p) =
UCEF (p)
LCEF (p)
  1:
In what follows we shall explore properties of this risk measure. We shall use the notation
RX instead of RF when a need arises to emphasize the dependence of the risk measure
on the random variable X itself.
Property 8.1. We have the following statements:
(i) If the risk X is constant, that is, X = d for some constant d > 0, then RX = 0.
(ii) Multiplying the risk X by any constant d > 0 does not change the relative measure
of risk, that is, RdX = RX .
(iii) Adding any constant d > 0 to the risk X decreases the relative measure of risk, that
is, RX+d  RX .
The proof of Property 8.1 is technical and we have thus relegated it to Appendix A.
We shall next comment on the meaning of Property 8.1. First, given that we are dealing
with a relative measure of risk, points (i) and (ii) are self-explanatory. As to point (iii), it
says that lifting up the risk by any positive constant decreases its riskiness. This is natural
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because lifting up diminishes the relative variability of the risk. This, in turn, suggests
that the ordering of relative risk measures should be done, for example, in terms of the
Lorenz ordering, which is the most used tool for comparing the variability of economic-size
distributions. This leads us to the following property:
Property 8.2. If risks X and Y follow the Lorenz ordering X L Y , then RX  RY .
Proof. To verify Property 8.2, we rst recall (Arnold, 1987; see also Aaberge, 2000) that
the Lorenz ordering X L Y means the bound LX(p)  LY (p) for all p 2 [0; 1]. Since
RX(p) =
1  LX(p)
LX(p)
p
1  p   1
=
p
(1  p)LX(p)  
p
1  p   1;
the Lorenz ordering X L Y is therefore equivalent to the R-ordering X R Y , which
means RX(p)  RY (p) for all p 2 (0; 1). The latter bound and equation (8.2) conclude
the verication of Property 8.2. Note also that with the notion of R-ordering, we can
rephrase Property 8.2 as follows: if X R Y , then RX  RY . For detailed treatments of
various notions of stochastic orders, we refer to Shaked & Shantikumar (2007), and Li &
Li (2013).
We next discuss another closely related ordering property, called the Pigou-Dalton
principle of transfers. In the context of economic inequality, the principle says that pro-
gressive (i.e., from rich to poor) rank-order and mean-preserving transfers should decrease
the value of inequality measures. Hence, in the complementary risk-framework, the trans-
fers are risk-decreasing transformations. Formally (cf., Vergnaud, 1997), X is less risk-
unequal than Y in the Pigou-Dalton sense, denoted by X PD Y , if and only if X = Y
and X L Y . (Hence, X PD Y is sometimes denoted by X L;= Y .) The following
property is now obvious.
Property 8.3. If a Pigou-Dalton risk-increasing transfer turns risk X into Y so that
X PD Y , then RX  RY .
To have an idea of how the Pigou-Dalton transfers act, we recall (e.g., Shaked & Shan-
tikumar, 2007; Li & Li, 2013) that given X and Y with densities fX and fY respectively,
and assuming that their means are equal, if the sign of the dierence fX fY changes twice
according to the pattern (+; ;+), then X L Y . Examples of parametric distributions
with such pdf's can be found in, e.g., Kleiber & Kotz (2003).
In what follows, we shall discuss an example based on Zenga's (2010) distribution that
has demonstrated remarkably good performance in terms of goodness-of-t on a number
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of real income data sets. Namely, it is a very exible three-parameter distribution with
Pareto-type right-hand tail and whose density is
fZenga(x j ; ; ) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1
2Beta(; )

x

 1:5 Z x=
0
t+0:5 1(1  t) 2dt; x < ;
1
2Beta(; )


x
1:5 Z =x
0
t+0:5 1(1  t) 2dt; x  ;
where  is the scale parameter, which also happens to be the mean of the model, and 
and  are two shape parameters that aect, respectively, the center and the tails of the
distribution. In Figure 8.1 we have illustrated the Zenga density. For further details on
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Figure 8.1: Zenga(2; 2; ) density for various values of .
this distribution and its uses, we refer to Zenga (2010), Zenga et al. (2011, 2012), and
Arcagni & Zenga (2013). To see the eects of the Pigou-Dalton transfers in the case of
the Zenga distribution, the following theorem is particularly useful.
Theorem 8.4 (Arcagni & Porro, 2013). Assume X  Zenga(X ; X ; X) and Y 
Zenga(Y ; Y ; Y ), where all the parameters are positive. When X  Y and X  Y ,
then X PD Y .
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9 A general index of inequality and risk
Remarkably, the right-hand sides of equations (7.1) and (8.1), which are identical barring
their dierent relative-value functions v(x; y), can { with a little tweak { turn into a
very general measure of inequality: E[v(LCEF ();UCEF (
))], where  and  are two
gambles, which could be dependent or independent, degenerate or not. Obviously, when
 = , then we get either the Zenga index of economic inequality or the relative measure
of risk, depending on the relative-value function. Furthermore, if  = 0, then we have
UCEF () = F and thus E[v(LCEF (); F )], which is the Bonferroni index BF . By
appropriately choosing relative-value functions and personal gambles, we can reproduce
a number of other measures of economic inequality and risk, but the Chakravarty and
Atkinson indices require some little extension:
EF = w

E

v
 
LCEF;u();UCEF;u(
)

; (9.1)
where u and u are two utility functions, and
UCEF;u(p) =
1
1  p
Z 1
p
u(F 1(t))dt:
(Note that UCEF;u(0) = E[u
(X)].) All the examples that we have mentioned in this
paper, and also many other ones that appear in the literature, are special cases of the
just introduced index EF (e.g., Table 9.1).
We conclude this section with the note that in the examples throughout this paper,
the gambles  and  have been such that either they are identical (i.e.,  = ) or one of
them is degenerate (e.g.,  = 1 or  = 0). There is no reason why this should always be
the case: the two gambles can be dependent but not necessarily identical or degenerate.
This suggests that, in general, modeling probability distributions of the pair (; ) can
be conveniently achieved by, for example, specifying 1) marginal distributions of the
gambles  and , and also 2) a dependence structure between the two gambles using an
appropriately chosen copula. For methodological and applications-driven developments
related to copulas, we refer to Nelsen (2006), Jaworski et al. (2010), Jaworski et al. (2013),
and references therein.
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A Appendix: Technicalities
Proof of equations (5.3). Since the relative-value function is v(x; y) = 1  x=y, we
have
DWKF;h = 1  1
F
Z 1
0
LCEF (p)f(p) dp; (A.1)
where f(p) is the density function of the gamble h dened by equation (5.2). The
following are straightforward calculations:Z 1
0
LCEF (p)f(p) dp =
Z 1
0
1
p
Z p
0
F 1(t) dt

f(p) dp
=
Z 1
0
1
p
Z 1
0
1ft  pgF 1(t) dt

f(p) dp
=
Z 1
0
F 1(t)
Z 1
0
1
p
1ft  pg f(p) dp

dt
=
Z 1
0
F 1(t)
Z 1
t
1
p
f(p) dp

dt
=
1
1  h0(0)
Z 1
0
F 1(t)
 
h0(1  t)  h0(0) dt
=
1
1  h0(0)
Z 1
0
F 1(t)h0(1  t) dt  h0(0)F

:
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Combining this result with equation (A.1), we obtain the rst equation of (5.3). SinceZ 1
0
F 1(t)h0(1  t) dt =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
1fF 1(t) > xgh0(1  t) dt

dx
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
1ft > F (x)gh0(1  t) dt

dx
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
F (x)
h0(1  t) dt

dx
=
Z 1
0
h(1  F (x)) dx; (A.2)
we have the second equation of (5.3).
Proof of equations (6.2). Since the relative-value function is v(x; y) = x=y  1, we
have
E[v(UCEF (g); F )] =
1
F
Z 1
0
UCEF (p)f(p) dp  1; (A.3)
where f(p) is the density function of the gamble g dened by equation (6.1). The
following are straightforward calculations:Z 1
0
UCEF (p)f(p) dp =
Z 1
0
1
1  p
Z 1
p
F 1(t) dt

f(p) dp
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
1ft  pgF 1(t) dt

f(p)
1  p dp
=
Z 1
0
F 1(t)
Z 1
0
1ft  pg f(p)
1  p dp

dt
=
Z 1
0
F 1(t)
Z t
0
f(p)
1  p dp

dt:
Applying denition (6.1) of the density function f(p), we obtainZ 1
0
UCE(p)f(p) dp =
1
1  g0(1)
Z 1
0
F 1(t)
 
g0(1  t)  g0(1) dt
=
1
1  g0(1)
Z 1
0
F 1(t)g0(1  t) dt  g0(1)F

: (A.4)
Combining equations (A.4) and (A.3), we obtain the rst equation of (6.2). Using equation
(A.2) with g instead of h, we arrive at the second equation of (6.2).
Note A.1. From the mathematical point of view, equation (A.2) is elementary, but it was
a pivotal observation that allowed Jones and Zitikis (2003) to initiate the development
of statistical inference for the Wang (or distortion) risk measure. Since then, numerous
statistical results have appeared on risk measures: parametric and non-parametric, light-
and heavy-tailed cases have been explored in great detail by many authors.
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Proof of Property 8.1. Part (i) follows from the fact that if X = d for any constant
d > 0, then F 1X (p) = d and so UCEX(p) = LCEX(p) for every p 2 (0; 1). Part (ii) follows
from the fact that if d > 0, then F 1dX (p) = dF
 1
X (p) and so UCEdX(p)=LCEdX(p) =
UCEX(p)=LCEX(p) for every p 2 (0; 1). Part (iii) follows from the fact that F 1X+d(p) =
F 1X (p)+d for every d, and so the bound LCEX(p)  UCEX(p) together with the assumed
positivity of d imply
UCEX+d(p)
LCEX+d(p)
=
UCEX(p) + d
LCEX(p) + d
 UCEX(p)
LCEX(p)
:
The latter bound is equivalent to RX+d(p)  RX(p) for every p 2 (0; 1), which establishes
the bound RX+d  RX .
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